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Trends in Communist Propaganda

21 May 75

No. 20



# **TRENDS**

## **In Communist Propaganda**

**Confidential**

21 MAY 1975  
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CONFIDENTIAL  
21 MAY 1975

## CONTENTS

### VIETNAM

- Hanoi Unveils Communist Party Leadership in South Vietnam . . . . . 1  
DRV, PRG Leaders Speak at Rallies Marking Victory, Ho's Birth . . . . 4

### CAMBODIA

- Phnom Penh, Communist Allies Defend Mayaguez Ship Seizure . . . . . 7

### U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS

- Soviet Media Play Down Gromyko's Criticism of Kissinger . . . . . 10

### WARSAW PACT

- Pact 20th Anniversary Marked by Low-Key Observance . . . . . 11

### MIDDLE EAST

- Kosygin Visits Continue USSR Mideast Diplomatic Momentum . . . . . 14

### PRC FOREIGN RELATIONS

- Peking Raps Both Superpowers on Anniversary of Mao Statement . . . . 18

### PRC-TAIWAN

- Peking Increases Invective Against Kuomintang Leaders . . . . . 19

### CHINA

- Campaign Pushes Communist Ideas To Replace Bourgeois Rights . . . . 21

### YUGOSLAVIA

- Belgrade Rebukes Austria on Anniversary of State Treaty . . . . . 24

### CUBA

- Havana Ignores, Moscow Approves OAS Move To Lift Sanctions . . . . 26

### NOTES

- Hungarian Premier Change; PRAVDA on Japanese Socialists;  
New Burmese CP Chairman . . . . . 29 •

### APPENDIX

- Moscow, Peking Broadcast Statistics . . . . . 1

CONFIDENTIAL

- 1 -

## VIETNAM

The Vietnamese communists' formal celebration of their victory in South Vietnam was marked by the unprecedented visit to Saigon of a high-level party and state delegation from Hanoi and the surfacing of the top Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) leaders responsible for South Vietnam. The highlight of the emergence of the communist party organization in the South was the appearance in Saigon of Pham Hung, a VWP Political Bureau member whose activities have not been publicly reported since he became chief of the party organization in the South eight years ago--a position which the media only now acknowledge.

The leaders of the PRG, Nguyen Huu Tho and Huynh Tan Phat, also made their first postwar public appearance on the occasion of the arrival in Saigon of the North Vietnamese delegation which included DRV President Tong Duc Thang and Political Bureau members Le Duc Tho, Le Thanh Nghi, and Van Tien Dung. Communist media reports on the lineup of officials at arrival ceremonies and at festivities in Saigon clearly reflected the party's dominant position, however, listing party leaders ahead of the PRG officials. The role of the PRG as the international representative for South Vietnam has been consistently maintained by Vietnamese media, but there has been no comparable evidence in the postwar period indicating an active role for the PRG domestically.

The communists' celebration of their takeover in the South and the 85th anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's birth (19 May) provided public forums for Hanoi and PRG leaders to expound on postwar policies. First Secretary Le Duan in his 15 May victory day speech in Hanoi maintained that the events in Vietnam will have a positive effect on developments in Southeast Asia, and NLFV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho, in his remarks of the same day in Saigon, reiterated longstanding PRG willingness to have diplomatic relations with all countries. Speaking in Hanoi on the 19th at festivities marking Ho's birthday, DRV National Assembly Standing Committee Chairman Truong Chinh for the most part eulogized the later DRV leader but also seemed to take a harder line on treatment of those conquered in the South than had communist propaganda in the immediate wake of the takeover.

## HANOI UNVEILS COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERSHIP IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Hanoi openly acknowledged its control of the revolution in South Vietnam with the appearance at the victory celebrations of VWP officials who are responsible for the South. Media identification

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

FBIS TRENDS

21 MAY 1975

- 2 -

of the officials has also surfaced the broad framework of the party organization, with references to the "South Vietnam Party Organization"--apparently the equivalent of the formerly clandestine Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN) which was responsible for the southern portion of South Vietnam--and to the VWP's Committee for Zone Five, controlling the northern part of the South. During the war Hanoi media regularly attributed to the VWP the major guiding role in the revolution but still explicitly claimed that the South Vietnamese people's struggle was being led by the PRG and the National Liberation Front (NFLSV).

North Vietnam's longstanding policy of camouflaging its control in South Vietnam was dropped on 14 May when Hanoi radio reported that the North Vietnamese delegation to the Saigon victory celebrations had been met at the airport on the previous day by VWP Political Bureau member Pham Hung, who was further identified as the "Secretary of the South Vietnam Party Organization." A later Saigon radio report on the 15 May celebration in addition noted that he was "political commissar of the South Vietnam PLAF Command." Pham Hung last appeared in public at a reception in North Vietnam on 29 September 1967. A list of Ho Chi Minh's funeral committee in September 1969 included Pham Hung, identifying him in his positions as a member of the Political Bureau and a DRV vice premier, but he was not reported as being present in Hanoi. He was formally relieved of his government positions in 1971 when in April he failed to run for election to the fourth legislature of the DRV National Assembly and in June his name was not included in the list of vice premiers elected by the new legislature.

Surfacing in Saigon along with Pham Hung was Nguyen Van Linh--identified as deputy secretary of the South Vietnam Party Organization. Linh had previously been identified by the media on at least one occasion as the deputy secretary general of the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), the name given the communist party in South Vietnam when it first publicly emerged in January 1962.\* The role of the PRP in South Vietnam was mentioned periodically in media comment from 1962 to 1966, but rarely mentioned thereafter.

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\* A 6 September 1969 Liberation Radio report listing the South Vietnamese delegation to Ho's funeral identified him as the PRP deputy secretary general. For background on media references to the PRP, see the FBIS SURVEY Supplement of 15 September 1969, pages 1-4, and the FBIS SPECIAL REPORT of 24 July 1969, RS. 97, "Provisional Revolutionary Government and the People's Revolutionary Party in South Vietnam."

CONFIDENTIAL

- 3 -

Another South Vietnamese party official showed up in Saigon on 19 May when the main speech at the rally marking Ho Chi Minh's birthday was delivered by a Nguyen Van Ho,\* who was said by Saigon radio to be a "member of the Standing Committee of the Executive Committee of the Saigon-Gia Dinh Municipal Party Organization" of the PRP, as well as the chairman of the Saigon Federation of Liberation Trade Unions and a representative of the Saigon-Gia Dinh Municipal NFLSV committee. (The meeting was not attended by either Pham Hung or Nguyen Van Linh, and the head of the Saigon military management committee, Tran Van Tra, was also absent. Although Pham Hung and Linh were present at the 15 May victory celebration in Saigon and later meetings on the 16th, neither is known to have appeared since the departure of the North Vietnamese delegation from Saigon on the 17th.)

Another figure formerly associated publicly with the PRP, Vo Chi Cong, was reported by Saigon radio to have attended 15 May victory celebrations in Danang and was for the first time acknowledged to be a member of the VWP Central Committee. Cong was the only official named as attending the Danang ceremonies, and his position as the leading party figure in the northern half of the South was confirmed by the radio's further identification of him as "Secretary of the Zone Five VWP committee" and "Zone Five Political Officer." Further reflecting the anomalous ties emerging between northern and southern organizations, the radio also listed Vo Chi Cong's long-standing public position as a vice chairman of the NFLSV Central Committee Presidium.

**PRG/NFLSV ROLE** The relationship of the PRG and the NFLSV to the communist party in postwar South Vietnam can be inferred from Vietnamese media reports on appearances in Saigon by PRG President Huynh Tan Phat and Nguyen Huu Tho, NFLSV chairman and chairman of the PRG Advisor Council. The Hanoi radio report on the airport arrival ceremony greeting the North Vietnamese delegation on 13 May listed Pham Hung first among the welcomers,

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\* Other reports on the recent activities of Nguyen Van Ho have identified him in the abbreviated form as Nguyen Ho. Although the present media reports do not indicate his background, there was a Nguyen Ho identified by Vietnamese communist media in the early 1950's as the vice president of the Saigon-Cholon resistance administrative committee. In the late 1950's--following the communist regrouping in North Vietnam--and as late as 1963, a Nguyen Ho was a member of the presidium of North Vietnam's trade union federation.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 4 -

followed by Nguyen Huu Tho and PRG President Phat. Other radio reports on activities in Saigon in the following days have also listed Pham Hung's deputy Nguyen Van Linh ahead of Tho and Phat.

While Hanoi claims that Vietnam has been "reunified," there apparently will be two governments for some time. However, it seems clear that the domestic administration of the South will be controlled by the VWP. The timeframe and plan for the transition to a single government has not yet been revealed by Hanoi and may not yet have been decided. Le Duan, in his 15 May victory rally speech only briefly touched upon the question in tasking the South with building a "national democratic regime" and a national and democratic economy and culture.

#### DRV, PRG LEADERS SPEAK AT RALLIES MARKING VICTORY, HO'S BIRTH

LE DUAN        Speaking at the 15 May victory celebration in Hanoi, VWP First Secretary Le Duan briefly recalled Vietnam's long history of thwarting foreign invaders and noted that the recommendations contained in Ho Chi Minh's testament to rid the country of "U.S. imperialists" and reunite it "under one roof" have now been accomplished. The First Secretary declared that the credit for the victory should be given to the armed forces, the party, and international benefactors, such as the Soviet Union and China, for the support and aid they provided. He gave particular emphasis to the concept of "national independence," and made frequent allusions to Vietnam's heroic past. According to Le Duan, national independence has a twofold importance: domestically, once having achieved it, the laboring people can be freed of "oppression and exploitation," and internationally, it can influence the "world revolutionary movement."

Le Duan did not specify what responsibility Hanoi may feel for encouraging revolution in neighboring countries, but he did suggest that North Vietnam will use its new strength and influence to bring about a further reduction of the U.S. position in Southeast Asia. The First Secretary boasted that Vietnam's victory, coupled with that in Cambodia and Laos, had "created new favorable conditions for safeguarding peace and national independence in Indochina and Southeast Asia." He went on to promise that the DRV would "persist in its policy of strengthening solidarity and friendship with its neighbors in Southeast Asia and in countries of the third world, in their struggle to regain and maintain national independence, consolidate sovereignty, and oppose all schemes and maneuvers of imperialism and old and new colonialism."

CONFIDENTIAL



- 5 -

A 2 May NHAN DAN editorial entitled "The Irreversible Trend of Southeast Asian Nations" echoed Le Duan's speech regarding the future of the region in the aftermath of the communist successes in Indochina. The editorial contended that "a rare opportunity for the independent and free development of Southeast Asian nations has come," and predicted that the people in the region would "surely rise up and take their destiny into their hands and get rid of all control by the barbarous imperialists." It optimistically maintained that Southeast Asia is now facing "unprecedentedly favorable perspectives" and it enthusiastically applauded the "firm and punitive blows" the Cambodian army recently dealt the "U.S. aggressors" and the current "widespread anti-U.S. feelings in Bangkok."

NGUYEN HUU THO      NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho's address to the 15 May victory rally in Saigon expressed the same jubilation as Le Duan did for the "liberation" of the southern half of the country. Thus, Tho declared that "from now on, our country is no longer partitioned, and the North and the South are together under the same roof again." Vietnamese communist leaders have consistently spoken of Vietnam as a single country, a concept also voiced in the opening articles of the Paris agreement. Whatever specific steps Hanoi and Front leaders might now have in mind for formal amalgamation of the two separate entities that exist in Vietnam were not articulated in the rhetoric of the ceremonies.

It is clear, however, from Nguyen Huu Tho's assertions, that the PRG will continue to function separately in the field of foreign relations. In professing the PRG's policy of "peace and nonalignment," Tho noted that his government was ready to establish diplomatic relations with "all countries without distinction as to the political and social systems." While not specifically excluding the United States from his invitation for recognition, he did point out in the same context that the United States must still fulfill its "obligations" under the Paris agreement.

Earlier statements by PRG leaders have been more specific with regard to the United States. For example, when asked by an AFP correspondent--in an interview transmitted by LPA on 7 April--about the likelihood of the PRG establishing relations with the United States after the war, Nguyen Huu Tho reiterated the standard PRG policy that relations with all nations would be entertained, and he specifically mentioned the United States. The PRG has been consistent in its willingness to have diplomatic relations with the

CONFIDENTIAL

21 MAY 1975

- 5 -

United States, and language to this effect was included in the PRG's 12-point program issued in June 1969 at the time of the government's formal establishment. And PRG President Huynh Tan Phat, in remarks at a June 1971 celebration marking the second anniversary of the PRG, cited the communists' proposals for ending the war as "creating conditions for future relations . . . between us and the Americans."

TRUONG CHINH      Speaking at the Hanoi rally marking the 85th anniversary of Ho Chi Minh's birth,\* politburo member and National Assembly Standing Committee Chairman Truong Chinh was notably harsh regarding treatment to be meted out to the defeated southerners. According to Truong Chinh, communists in the South will have to "continue to struggle to completely smash the war machinery and the puppet administration from top to bottom, to root out all vestiges of the neo-colonialism of U.S. imperialism, . . . to check and punish all acts of counterrevolution, hooliganism, and gangsterism."

Truong Chinh indicated that the VWP Central Committee had been focusing its attention on the problem of party building, and he quoted generalized guidance on the subject from what is apparently the resolution of the rarely mentioned 23d party plenum. The fact that the plenum had been held was first noted in Hanoi media in an editorial in the January issue of the DRV party journal HOC TAP.\*\*

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\* The anniversary is one of three major holidays that Vietnam is celebrating this year. The first, the 45th anniversary of the founding of the Indochinese Communist Party--the presently constituted Vietnam Workers Party--was marked on 3 February and is discussed in the TRENDS of 5 February 1975, pages 9-11. The last of the major holidays will be the 30th anniversary of the founding of the DRV, on 2 September.

\*\* For a discussion of the 23d plenum, see the TRENDS of 29 January 1975, page 8.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 7 -

## CAMBODIA

## PHNOM PENH, COMMUNIST ALLIES DEFEND MAYAGUEZ SHIP SEIZURE

Cambodia's newly established communist regime denounced the U.S. military operation to recover the freighter Mayaguez in a 16 May press communique from the RGNU information ministry which charged that the U.S. action on the previous day was an "act of aggression" and that air attacks on Cambodian facilities had occurred hours after Cambodia had released the Mayaguez crew. The communique, like a communique from the same ministry released on the 15th while the U.S. operation was under way, justified the seizure of the Mayaguez as a defense of Cambodian sovereignty against the intruding "spy ship" and insisted that the United States had provoked the incident. Phnom Penh's response at this level--through communiques signed by RGNU spokesman and Minister of Information and Propaganda Hu Nim--is consistent with the precedent set by its only other foreign policy pronouncement since the RGNU seized control of the country in mid-April. Hu Nim likewise signed a statement on 10 May protesting "dishonest propaganda" allegedly spread by the United States about repressive Cambodian internal policies and maltreatment of foreigners.

Outside of Cambodia, head of state Prince Sihanouk sent a message from Peking on 16 May to Algerian President Boumediene appealing for Third World support, and on 18 May he expressed "full support" for Cambodia's action in a cable to RGNU Deputy Prime Minister Khieu Samphan. North and South Vietnam and North Korea each backed Cambodia's position with authoritative statements at foreign ministry or ministry spokesman level, while China's first leadership comment came in a speech by Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien. Soviet media reaction thus far has been restricted largely to low-level reportage on the incident.

CAMBODIA        The 15 May Phnom Penh communique, which announced the RGNU decision to release the Mayaguez just as the U.S. recovery operation was getting underway, was replete with avowals of Cambodia's wish to "provoke no one or to make trouble." The communique alleged that the ship had intruded into Cambodian territorial waters on a spy mission as part of what it described in detail as a continuing campaign to conduct sabotage, espionage, and blockade against Cambodia, and it affirmed Cambodia's right to protect national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The communique contained one critical reference to the Ford Administration

CONFIDENTIAL

- 8 -

by name--the first such mention by the Communists since their 17 April takeover of Phnom Penh. It referred to U.S. planes sinking "two" Cambodian patrol boats on 14 May, saying that Phnom Penh still had "no precise idea" of the damage or the number of killed--a possible indication of communications difficulties between Phnom Penh and the coast.

The briefer 16 May pronouncement labeled the landing of U.S. Marines on Tang Island and the bombings of the Sihanoukville area the previous day as "savage, ferocious, insane aggressive acts," claiming that they had begun three and one-half hours after Phnom Penh had "returned" the crew. It said Washington's actions were "proof" that the United States had provoked the incident as a pretext to intensify its "blockade" and "sabotage" against Cambodia.

The Mayaguez incident also drew passing mention in a 19 May Information and Propaganda Ministry statement devoted mainly to denouncing as "tricks of U.S. imperialism and its hirelings" recent Western press reports of a Cambodian ultimatum to Thailand over their common border. Noting the U.S. use of bases in Thailand during the fray, this statement predicted that "despite these historical facts" Cambodia and Thailand "can live peacefully as neighboring countries."

Sihanouk's 16 May cable to Algerian President Boumediene, carried by NCNA on the 17th, appealed for Third World condemnation of the "cowardly and monstrous act of aggression" of the United States. Declaring that the United States would "always remain a paper tiger," Sihanouk charged that the United States was attempting to revenge its "ignominious and undeniable defeat" in Cambodia and Vietnam. His 18 May cable to Khieu Samphan, reported by NCNA on the 19th, expressed full support for RGNU measures and the CPNLF's effectiveness in handling the incident, and added that "for all its ridiculous bragging, the Ford-Kissinger clique has not emerged any nobler from this frantic adventure."

FOREIGN SUPPORT      PRC Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien made Peking's initial response to the incident, in brief remarks delivered at a 15 May reception given by the DRV envoy in Peking to celebrate the communist takeover of Saigon. Li accused the Mayaguez of intruding into Cambodia's territorial waters, backed Cambodia's "legitimate measures" against the ship, and denounced as "an outright act of piracy" the U.S. bombing of Cambodian ships and territory. Peking's formal response to the

CONFIDENTIAL

- 9 -

Cambodian protests came in a 17 May PEOPLE'S DAILY Commentator article, which denounced the "acts of piracy pure and simple" by the United States and offered a perfunctory, generalized pledge of Chinese support. Chinese comment has avoided all mention of the Ford Administration and did not directly condemn the United States in the name of the Chinese Government. By contrast, Peking's response to the January 1968 Pueblo incident off North Korea had come at the formal level of a PRC Government statement on 28 January which had offered the "firm support" of the Chinese Government and people against "U.S. imperialism's flagrant provocation."

A 15 May DRV Foreign Ministry statement denounced the alleged violation of Cambodian territorial waters by the "spyship" Mayaguez and the dispatch of U.S. Marines to Thailand as "an extremely serious act of war." Attacking the Ford Administration by name, the statement concluded that the United States was persisting in its "policy of intervention and aggression" against Cambodia and demanded that the United States cease its "acts of war" and withdraw its Marines from Thailand. It promised to "resolutely support" Cambodia's right to defend its "territory, airspace, and territorial waters." A 16 May PRG Foreign Ministry statement closely paralleled the DRV statement. Most comment did not criticize Thai involvement in the episode, but a 17 May Hanoi radio station commentary broadcast in English, noted that it was "regrettable that the Thai authorities had allowed the United States to freely encroach upon their sovereignty, thus causing a bad effect on their relationship with neighboring countries." However, the commentary singled out only the "Ford Administration" as the party to be held "fully responsible for all the consequences arising therefrom."

A 18 May DPRK Foreign Ministry spokesman statement, offering to "fully support" the RGNU's stand, denounced the U.S. military response as evidence that the United States was "still persistently clinging to the policy of aggression and interference" in Indochina and Asia. An 18 May NODONG SINMUN commentary pointed out that the "frantic use of force" by the United States demonstrated its "aggressive ambition to hang on in Asia at all costs, even while being hit hard and kicked out of Asia." The commentary noted the Thai Government protest over the "blatant infringement" of Thai sovereignty by the United States and predicted that the United States would "surely be kicked out" of Asia, including Korea.

CONFIDENTIAL

## U. S. - SOVIET RELATIONS

## SOVIET MEDIA PLAY DOWN GROMYKO'S CRITICISM OF KISSINGER

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's criticism of Secretary Kissinger in his 14 May Warsaw Pact anniversary speech in Moscow has been played down in subsequent Soviet accounts of the speech. The passage criticizing the Secretary, included in the live Moscow radio broadcast, was omitted from the TASS English-language version, which TASS described as a "text" but which in fact was a report based on paraphrases and extensive excerpts. The critical passage was also omitted from the account carried in PRAVDA on the 15th, which appeared to be the same TASS report with minor editorial revisions. Neither the TASS English nor PRAVDA report, moreover, indicated that Gromyko had even so much as mentioned Kissinger.

After asserting that Kissinger, in his 12 May St. Louis speech, had made "a number of correct points," Gromyko said:

But the same U.S. Secretary of State was rather sharp in his criticism of those American officials who have been timid and not very insistent in general, but have all the same opposed the spiraling military budgets and favor cuts in military budgets, including the United States' own military budget. The U.S. Secretary of State criticized those critics; he defended the spiraling military budgets and the course of their further spiraling. To put it mildly, these two things--support for a policy of detente and increasing military budgets--do not go together very well.

The theory expressed in some Western news reports that Gromyko's criticism of Kissinger may have been extemporaneous does not jibe with the character of the remarks nor the background against which they were made. It seems likely that Moscow felt that some sort of response to Kissinger's criticism of the Soviet Union in his St. Louis speech\* was necessary, particularly in view of the scheduled 19-20 May Vienna meeting between Gromyko and the Secretary. At the same time, by refraining from exploiting the issue, Moscow has served notice that it remains committed to improving the atmosphere of U.S.-Soviet relations.

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\* In St. Louis, Secretary Kissinger had said that "the willingness of the Soviet Union to exploit strategic opportunities . . . constitutes a heavy mortgage on detente. If detente turns into a formula for more selective exploitation of opportunities, the new trend in U.S.-Soviet relations will be in jeopardy."

CONFIDENTIAL

ERIS TRENDS

22 MAY 1975

- 11 -

## WARSAW PACT

### PACT 20TH ANNIVERSARY MARKED BY LOW-KEY OBSERVANCE

The only joint meeting held on the 20th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact was a low-level gathering of parliamentary leaders of the member countries in the Polish capital on 14-15 May. Elsewhere the anniversary was marked by meetings held in the respective capitals, including one in Moscow addressed by Gromyko. The East European meetings were addressed by speakers at the Politburo, deputy premier, or defense ministry level.

While the 10th anniversary in 1965 had been observed in low key, it might have been expected that the second decennial--marking the end of the Pact's statutory 20-year span and the start of its 10-year renewal period--would be marked by a Pact Political Consultative Committee meeting or other top level joint gathering. The absence of such a gathering had the advantage for Moscow of avoiding any show of militance which might jeopardize early conclusion of the European Security Conference. It also averted possible difficulties with the Romanians, who might have refused to attend such a meeting, or would likely have been recalcitrant partners if they did attend. As it was, the Romanians sent a less prominent representative to the Warsaw session than did the orthodox Pact members. Following the lead of a similar document issued by the Soviet governing bodies on 9 May, the Warsaw Pact anniversary meeting issued an innocuous peace appeal calling on European parliaments to help speed the conclusion of the CSCE.

Leading Soviet pronouncements on the anniversary emphasized the harmony between the peaceful objectives of the defensive Warsaw alliance and Moscow's detente policy. They also reasserted the Pact's readiness to dissolve itself simultaneously with dissolution of NATO. Gromyko, in voicing this readiness in his address at the 14 May Moscow anniversary meeting, refrained from adding the usual followup proviso that as long as NATO exists, the Warsaw Pact must strengthen its defenses. Both parts of the formulation were, however, included in PRAVDA's 14 May editorial article on the anniversary. In a tougher stance in keeping with his position, Pact Commander Yakubovskiy in an IZVESTIYA article on the 14th did not include a reference to mutual dissolution of the blocs, declaring instead simply that as long as the "aggressive NATO bloc" exists and effective disarmament measures have not been implemented, the socialist countries deem it necessary to

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL

THIS TRENDS  
21 MAY 1975

- 12 -

strengthen their defenses. The three pronouncements included now routine references to the Warsaw Pact's "defense of socialist gains"--Moscow's ex post facto, rationale for the August 1968 Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia. This phrase had appeared for the first time in a Soviet bloc treaty in the new Soviet-Czechoslovak friendship pact of 6 May 1970.

The Moscow statements also welcomed what were described as the positive manifestations of detente, attributing the credit for these developments to the peace program announced by Brezhnev at the 24th CPSU Congress. All three statements balanced characterization of the Pact as the main center for coordination of foreign policy with insistence that the Warsaw alliance was based on principles of equality, independence, sovereignty, and noninterference.

ROMANIA As reported by AGERPRES, the speech by Grand National Assembly deputy chairman Mocuta at the Warsaw parliamentary session on the 15th was devoted largely to inoffensive generalities. He called on the European Security Conference to ensure security from the threat or use of force and the right of all countries to develop according to their own interests. More characteristically, the speech by the Romanian chief of staff, Colonel General Coman at a 14 May Bucharest meeting on the Pact anniversary asserted in effect that the more devoted a socialist army is to its people, party, and state the stronger is "the entire world socialist system." He added that Bucharest was developing relations with the armies of "all" socialist countries, as well as those of the Warsaw Pact states. Stressing the same points, a SCINTEIA anniversary article added Bucharest's stock demand, embarrassing to Moscow, calling for concrete steps to dismantle military bases on and to withdraw foreign troops from the territories of other states. The article also stated that the Pact's defenses must be strengthened as long as NATO exists, stipulating that priority in this regard should be given to "political" measures--improving mutual information and consultation among the Pact members.

YUGOSLAVIA In apparently the only Yugoslav comment on the Warsaw Pact anniversary, Zagreb commentator Sundic on the 13th cited Belgrade's traditional aversion to blocs in voicing the conviction that none of the existing world alliances could justify its existence. He added that there were no prospects whatever for the dissolution of either the Warsaw Pact or NATO and that both groups have become, for the great powers, more political and ideological than military alliances. In keeping

CONFIDENTIAL



- 13 -

with the current sour Yugoslav mood over recent Soviet slighting of the role of Yugoslav partisans in World War II, Sundic recalled sarcastically that in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 "the Warsaw Pact had major tasks which it carried out," adding that few if any members of either bloc want the alliances "to be reduced merely to the establishing of a certain order or system." Sundic reiterated Belgrade's readiness to cooperate with any country, bloc member or nonaligned, on the basis of full equality and noninterference.

ALBANIA      A 7 May ZERI I POPULLIT editorial article used the anniversary for a new denunciation of the Pact as an instrument of Soviet hegemonism. Tirana had joined the Pact as a charter member in 1955, stopped all participation in its activities in 1962, and formally withdrew in 1968 after the Pact intervention in Czechoslovakia. Soviet forces, it added, perform the function of "a colonial occupying army" in Czechoslovakia, Poland, the GDR, Hungary, and Bulgaria. As usual there was no mention of the seventh Pact member--Romania.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 14 -

## MIDDLE EAST

### KOSYGIN VISITS CONTINUE USSR MIDEAST DIPLOMATIC MOMENTUM

With Premier Kosygin's official visits to Libya (12-15 May) and to Tunisia (15-17 May), Moscow has continued the momentum of its activity aimed toward eventual resumption of the Geneva Mideast conference. Kosygin's trips, his first to each country, came on the heels of the recent round of high-level Arab visitors to Moscow in April and early May. Kosygin does not appear to have been very successful, however, in obtaining agreement with the two countries on key issues of a Mideast settlement. This was especially evident in Libya, which continues to oppose a negotiated Arab-Israeli settlement and to support radical factions within the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). In Tunisia, despite predictable general agreement on the broad elements of a negotiated Mideast settlement, differences remained over the basis for a settlement, with President Bourguiba reiterating Tunisia's longstanding advocacy of a return to the 1947 UN partition plan for Palestine. On the other hand, there was a strong emphasis throughout both visits on strengthening bilateral relations. And some Libyan sources hinted strongly that an increase in mutual Soviet-Libyan military cooperation was discussed.

#### ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE

During Kosygin's stay in Libya, it was clear that Moscow and Tripoli continued to advocate conflicting approaches to a Mideast settlement. Libyan sources ignored the issue of resumption of the Geneva Mideast conference; and, as expected, the 15 May Soviet-Libyan communique made no mention of the conference. Kosygin in his dinner speech on the 12th, however, told his Libyan audience flatly that "the situation requires resumption of the work of the Geneva conference." He added--as Soviet sources frequently have over the past two months--that the conference must "of course" be thoroughly prepared. But perhaps reflecting the difficulties Moscow has experienced in preparations and alignment of inter-Arab and Soviet-Arab positions, he did not repeat the standard Soviet formulation of recent months calling for "speediest" or "earliest" resumption of the conference.\*

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\* Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, in a 14 May speech in Moscow marking the Warsaw Pact 20th anniversary, used a similar expression in noting simply that the Soviet Union "proposes to resume" the work of the Geneva conference. He added that the USSR has in mind "serious preparations" and a "serious approach to its tasks, although we are not so sure that all the conference's participants want the same."

CONFIDENTIAL

- 15 -

Kosygin stated that the essence of the Soviet position "remains unchanged" and reaffirmed Moscow's stand on the three broad elements it has regularly stressed as part of a settlement:

Complete withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territories occupied in 1967; implementation of Palestinian legitimate national rights, including the right to create their own state; and safeguarding of the independent existence and development of all states in the region.

In predictable contrast to Libya, Tunisia was willing to join Moscow in calling for a political solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The joint communique on the 17th stated that both sides believed it desirable to resume the Geneva conference "as soon as possible after careful preparation" and with PLO participation on an equal basis with other participants. Tunisia also agreed--as Egypt and Syria had agreed in communiqués issued after their foreign ministers' visits to Moscow in April--that "any partial measures should be part and parcel of the overall settlement."

The Soviet-Tunisian communique also stated that both sides advocated a settlement "on the basis of implementing the well-known UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions." That this formulation was an attempt to paper over differences on the precise basis for a settlement was suggested in remarks by President Bourguiba on the 15th and their subsequent handling by Soviet media. Reaffirming Tunisia's longtime stand on a settlement, Bourguiba asserted that the international community had committed a serious injustice in its 1947 decision to partition Palestine and that Israel must now be forced to respect the international law to which it owes its existence. In this context Bourguiba said that the Geneva conference could, with the participation of the PLO, "achieve a political solution in conformity with the UN resolution"--by which he clearly meant, as he has often said in the past, the 1947 UN General Assembly partition vote and not, as in Soviet references, the UN Security Council Resolution 242 of 1967 or Resolution 338 of 1973. TASS, reporting Bourguiba's remarks on the 16th, rendered them more in line with Moscow's position. TASS cited Bourguiba as stressing that Israel should be compelled "to respect international law, to which it owes its existence" and that the Geneva conference "should lead to a peaceful settlement in accordance with the UN resolutions." PRAVDA's text on the 17th omitted Bourguiba's reference to the 1947 partition decision.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS TRENDS  
21 MAY 1975

- 16 -

Both the Soviet-Libyan and Soviet-Tunisian communiques sought to suggest mutual agreement on the issue of general support for the Palestinian cause. Both, for example, routinely conditioned the establishment of a Mideast peace on Israel's withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and on assurance of Palestinian "national legitimate rights, including their right to self-determination and to establishment of their own state." There were ample indications during Kosygin's visits, however, that Moscow and Libya have continued to differ sharply over the kind and degree of support which the Palestinians should receive.

On 11 May, the day of Kosygin's departure for Libya, Tripoli's ARAB REVOLUTION NEWS AGENCY (ARNA) underlined Libya's long-confirmed position on Palestinian questions in reporting that the previous evening Prime Minister Jallud had received a delegation of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine/General Command (PFLP/GC), led by Ahmad Jibril, PFLP/GC general secretary. This group is one of the "rejectionist front" factions in the PLO that reject the notion of a negotiated settlement with Israel. Reflecting the hardline policy of the rejectionists, the ARNA report stated that the two sides held "identical" points of view on the Palestinian issue as well as on the "firm rejection of the direct negotiations conference at Geneva aimed at authorizing suspicious plots." After Kosygin's visit, there were indications from Tripoli media that Libya continues to advocate a military solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and to support the radical factions within the PLO. Jallud, for example, in a speech on the 15th before the "National Seminar To Support the Palestinian Arab Revolution," held 15-18 May in Tripoli, urged the Palestinians to form a "revolutionary government" that would define a clear way to liberate Palestine--by force--and indicated that the government could be based in Libya. As reported by ARNA on the 16th, Jallud also sought to distinguish between creation of a Palestinian state, on the one hand, and a Palestinian revolutionary government on the other, asserting that the former would result from an international decision and the latter from a Palestinian decision. Jallud said that the conflict with Israel "cannot be settled by a conference, a third party, or the United Nations," and that he had been unable to determine what heads of state meant by the expression "legitimate national rights of the Palestinians." He added that "force alone can impart a meaning to this."

CONFIDENTIAL

- 17 -

**BILATERAL RELATIONS** Perhaps partly to offset the lack of accord on key Arab-Israeli issues, a pronounced emphasis on expanding and improving bilateral relations was evident in the publicity, dinner speeches, and final communiques for both visits. In the case of Tunisia, the emphasis seemed essentially pro forma, and the agreements signed or discussed appeared of minor importance. As noted in the Soviet-Tunisian communique, for example, a program for cultural and scientific cooperation for 1975-76 was signed; and both sides called for regular relations at all levels and for political consultations to further mutual cooperation.

In the case of Libya, however, the mutual emphasis on expanding and improving bilateral relations--while also encompassing routine aspects--was notable for the strong hints that increased military cooperation between the two countries had been at least considered. Jallud in his dinner speech on the 12th, for example, in remarks carried by IZVESTIYA and PRAVDA on the 14th and by ARNA on the 15th, expressed his conviction that Kosygin's visit would lead to "concrete acts to strengthen mutual cooperation in various fields, in particular economic, cultural, technical, military, and others." Thanking the USSR for the economic and military aid presently being given, Jallud said that "possibilities exist for further development of this assistance." Additionally, Tripoli's "Voice of the Arab Homeland" on the 15th broadcast remarks by Kosygin, during a side trip to Benghazi on the 14th, that his visit to Libya sought to develop and strengthen Soviet-Libyan cooperation "in the political, economic, and military fields." And ARNA, reporting on the 15th the signing of agreements on economic, technical, and cultural matters, noted that Libyan leaders' talks with Kosygin had covered "all fields."

There were no indications, however, of whether any new agreements on military cooperation were in fact achieved during Kosygin's talks with the Libyans. In line with Moscow's normal reluctance to mention discussions on military cooperation in communiques, the Soviet-Libyan communique notes only that "economic, trade, and other questions of interest" to both sides had been discussed.

CONFIDENTIAL

21 MAY 1975

- 18 -

## PRC FOREIGN RELATIONS

### PEKING RAPS BOTH SUPERPOWERS ON ANNIVERSARY OF MAO STATEMENT

Peking has used the fifth anniversary of Mao's 20 May 1970 statement, a major anti-U.S. polemic prompted by the U.S. military incursion into Cambodia that spring, to sharply attack the Soviet Union's policy in Indochina and elsewhere while routinely scoring the United States. The anniversary was marked by a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial plus a Peking radio signed commentary, unlike the previous three anniversaries, which saw only signed articles in PEOPLE'S DAILY. Those previous anniversary commentaries had progressively deemphasized the Indochina slant of Mao's statement, focusing instead on denunciations of U.S.-Soviet efforts to reach international detente. The current revived stress on Indochina accords with Peking's efforts since the Cambodian and Vietnamese communist victories last month to play up the Indochinese successes as proof of the "correctness" of Mao's judgment expressed in the May 1970 statement that a small nation can defeat a powerful aggressor.

While Chinese comment did list the United States ahead of the USSR in referring critically to the two superpowers' policies, Peking's harsher criticism of the Soviet Union than of the United States this year is a striking departure from the spirit of the original, strongly anti-U.S. Mao statement. The editorial routinely criticized the U.S. "aggressors" for extending the Indochina war into Cambodia in 1970, but charged that Moscow had openly sided with Lon Nol and had also done "its utmost to undermine the anti-imperialist revolutionary struggle of the Indochinese people." The Peking radio commentary also played up the "ugly performance" of the USSR in Cambodia, charging among other things that Moscow had shot an "arrow at the victorious Cambodian people from behind" by its labeling of the communists' struggle there as a "fratricidal war" instead of a war of national liberation.

The PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial referred to both the United States and the USSR as "essentially weak." It noted that the United States had been beaten "black and blue" by the Indochinese peoples and "pounded" by various countries until it suffered a "heavy defeat," and that Soviet "social-imperialism, which is ambitious and commits aggression and expansion everywhere, can similarly be defeated." The radio commentary added that the recent Indochinese victories had thrown both superpowers into "panic," claiming that the United States "is making a desperate struggle trying hard to stabilize its position," while the USSR uses "tricks" and "cham support" in a vain attempt to gain temporary international advantage.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 19 -

## PRC - TAIWAN

## PEKING INCREASES INVECTIVE AGAINST KUOMINTANG LEADERS

Peking's initially subdued and relatively low-key reaction following the death of Chiang Kai-shek in early April has now given way to a barrage of the harshest invective against Nationalist leaders in more than a year over Peking radio's broadcasts to Taiwan. The recent Peking commentaries include the first criticism of Premier Chiang Ching-kuo since his father's death, as well as criticism of new President Yen Chia-kan, for Taipei's continuing refusal to accept 10 former Nationalist officials arrested by the PRC.\*

There are stark contrasts between current Peking treatment of Chiang Kai-shek, which includes abusive personal charges and epithets, and the initial Peking reaction to his death, which had been marked by a low-key SCNA report and subsequent muted personal criticism of him and his chief aides. For example, a 16 May commentary reviewed at length the "blood-stained criminal history" of Chiang Kai-shek, labeling him a "professional lackey of imperialism" and "a traitor and quisling." It used such harsh epithets as "Chiang the baldheaded," "bandit Chiang," and "scoundrel of the nation" to counter Taipei's effort to play up Chiang's role in Chinese history, charging that current Nationalist leaders were attempting to rewrite history in order to "gild the bald head of Chiang Kai-shek" and thereby use his prestige to "inflate themselves" and boost sagging morale on the island.

Another commentary on the 16th denounced Taipei's efforts to "extort" money from the people to build memorials for Chiang Kai-shek as nothing but the extension of Chiang's "black hand from the coffin" seeking donations, and as further proof that Taipei authorities would continue "to suck the life blood of the people" and were "cruelly murdering the people like vampires."

Though the earlier commentaries had not rebuked current Nationalist leaders by name, a 17 May signed commentary attacked Chiang Ching-kuo and Yen Chia-kan for playing "tricks" and "stalling" in refusing to accept the 10 former Nationalist

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\* PRC reaction to Chiang Kai-shek's death is discussed in the TRENDS of 9 April 1975, page 27, and recent Chinese comment on the released Nationalist officials is discussed in the TRENDS of 30 April 1975, page 13.

CONFIDENTIAL

21 MAY 1975

- 20 -

officials seeking permission to enter Taiwan. It claimed that Peking's amnesty decision has had an "irresistible" impact on Taiwan people and officials, who are demanding that the former Nationalist functionaries be allowed entry. The commentary charged Premier Chiang and President Yen with leading a Taipei effort to temporize and stall so as to reduce gradually the "strong repercussions arising from this incident."

CONFIDENTIAL



CONFIDENTIAL  
21 MAY 1975

- 21 -

## CHINA

## CAMPAIGN PUSHES COMMUNIST IDEAS TO REPLACE BOURGEOIS RIGHTS

Articles in the current May issue of RED FLAG by the Kiangsi party first secretary and other writers, as well as provincial radio broadcasts, indicate that China's current ideological campaign should focus more closely on curtailing bourgeois rights and encouraging communist goals and norms. The thrust of the campaign was typified in the article by Chiang Wei-ching, Kiangsi first secretary since January, who formerly was first secretary in Kiangsu before being purged in the cultural revolution. Chiang noted that in some areas there was no "effective" implementation of economic policies in the present stage, and that bourgeois rights were in fact expanding, rather than gradually being contracted. Chiang called for "vigorous efforts to propagate communist ideas and support and give full play to the communist initiative spirit of the broad masses in doing away with the narrowminded idea of bourgeois rights." While giving clear permission for voluntary moves toward communism Chiang cautioned, however, that "we must also pay attention to the stability of policies in given periods."

In recounting his experiences during a recent inspection trip in the countryside, Chiang declared that a number of capitalist tendencies were still more or less present. He noted that a "small number" of areas have indulged in "free planting" in order to earn more profit, instead of following state plans. Another small group was said to have encouraged individual rather than collective sideline occupations, while others stressed only accumulation of workpoints by commune members. "Most serious," according to Chiang, was the problem of "free trade." He said that people were not only demanding the right to dispose freely of household sideline production, "but also want to infinitely enlarge this right."

Chiang made a cursory attack on old landlords and bourgeois elements, but seemed most concerned about "new bourgeois elements" rising from within the ranks of the people, including "personnel in state organs." Chiang cited one brigade where 10 of 21 well-to-do middle peasant families "were seriously affected by spontaneous capitalist tendencies." Chiang called for solving the problem "mainly through strengthening education," and entreated people to join in class struggle without fear.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 22 -

Chiang acknowledged that in the past class struggle had proven dangerous for some innocent people, saying that in Kiangsi the Lin Piao clique had "dealt blows to a number of masses and cadres who deserved no such punishment." Chiang promised a movement to "study each case individually and exonerate those comrades."

Other articles in the May issue of RED FLAG echoed some of Chiang's themes. An article by Yuan Ching stated that the purpose of the current campaign was to "expand the dissemination of communist ideas so that more people will be liberated from the narrow view of bourgeois rights." A RED FLAG article by Wang Kuo-fan, a model peasant and member of the CCP Central Committee, stressed voluntary renunciation of privileges by cadres. Wang said he maintained his "pauper spirit" by accepting only the same workpoints as other members of his old commune. Wang criticized those who said that he should accept more, saying that they were influenced by the ideas of bourgeois rights. He also noted that not all cadre sacrifice was on a voluntary basis, stating that his county party committee has decreed that cadres may not accept gifts, must participate in collective labor, and must accept mass criticism.

Several Chinese provincial radios have recently provided examples of voluntary moves toward communist norms. A Shanghai WEN HUI PAO newsletter broadcast by the municipal radio on 13 May cited the example of a young cadre who went to the countryside in 1969 and has since become a production brigade cadre. The newsletter reported that he turned down a nomination to go to college in the summer of 1973, and that he only accepted remuneration from a youth team he organized, instead of the greater amount he was due as a brigade cadre. A production brigade cadre was said to have criticized this action as incompatible with the policy of "to each according to his work." He was told that "we should under no circumstances overemphasize the principle of 'to each according to his work' and forget about the revolution."

Liaoning provincial radio on 17 May lauded the "communist spirit" manifest in the policy of voluntary technical cooperation between units. Calling mass technical cooperation a "new thing," a 17 May LIAONING DAILY Commentator article praised those who "on their own initiative" have worked without remuneration after work hours on behalf of neighboring units. Commentator noted that workers were now "working hard without letup" to fulfill targets set by the Fourth NPC, and that mass technical cooperation was necessary if the struggle was to be won through self-reliance. The article listed the still-accepted policy of "wages commensurate to work" as one of the bourgeois rights being eliminated through the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL  
21 MAY 1975

- 23 -

technical cooperation movement, and stated that "many" activists in the movement "do not accept dinner invitations or gifts." The article does not reveal how central planning control is exercised over voluntary cooperation between factories or localities, but a radio article on cooperation broadcast the same day stated that a provincial technical cooperation committee has now been established.

The most detailed description to date of mandatory cadre rectification on the local level came in a 10 May Kwangtung provincial radio broadcast, which stressed the need for rectification in county CCP committees. County cadres were told to give "free rein" to the masses and also dare to make revolution themselves. The broadcast revealed that in Hainan and elsewhere many basic-level committees have started "rectifying the style of work at the work site." Praising such "battlefront" party rectification, the broadcast nonetheless warned that it must be combined with regular systematic party rectification, and not be used as a substitute.

Recent broadcasts arguing against enterprises devoting all their attention to production and ignoring revolution have employed both ideological and practical arguments in stating their position. A 17 May Hupeh provincial radio criticism of "workpoints in command" gave a material example demonstrating the bad results of the policy, describing a production team which awarded work points on the basis of seed sown. Some commune members are said to have sown too much seed in order to gain workpoints, wasting seed needed in another area. Shanghai radio on 17 May provided a bad example from the experience of local dockworkers who had put "tonnage in command," to the detriment of quality control. By following this concept workers enthusiastically loaded heavy cargo, such as steel products, but were dispirited in handling lighter loads. Because of production pressures, accidents occurred and mechanical equipment was damaged in the effort to load more heavy cargo. The broadcast emphasized that a tonnage count is necessary for accounting but should not be overemphasized.

CONFIDENTIAL

21 MAY 1975

## YUGOSLAVIA

## BELGRADE REBUKES AUSTRIA ON ANNIVERSARY OF STATE TREATY

The 20th anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty provided the occasion for a sharp polemical exchange between Belgrade and Vienna. A Yugoslav government statement, dated 13 May and published in BORBA on the 14th, charged Vienna with failing to meet its treaty obligations to Yugoslavia. Specifically, Belgrade's statement complained that Vienna continues to tolerate the activities of anti-Tito forces and has failed to grant full minority rights to Slovenes and Croats residing in Austria. The Belgrade statement was promptly denounced by Chancellor Kreisky and in an Austrian government statement. In addition, Vienna's ambassador to Belgrade was recalled for consultation. Belgrade media in turn reacted vigorously with personal attacks on Kreisky.

The Yugoslav statement contended that Vienna, in its relations with Belgrade, had failed to make "any" effort to implement the basic provisions of the 1955 treaty. Recounting longstanding charges, Belgrade accused Vienna of tolerating the revival of Nazism and the activities of Yugoslav nationalist groups as well as defaulting on its treaty obligation to provide its Slovene and Croatian citizens with full minority rights. Relations between the two countries have been particularly cool since 1972 when the Kreisky government appeared to yield to active German-speaking nationalist opposition to dual-language signposts in the Slovene region of southeast Austria. The Belgrade statement adhered closely to earlier government protests on these issues and gave no indication that Belgrade might seek to internationalize its dispute with Vienna--a possibility recently suggested by the media.

Kreisky's retort, reported by Vienna's DIE PRESSE on the 15th, brought immediate reaction from Belgrade. Although Kreisky had reserved the "fascist" label for Yugoslav "press commentaries," TANJUG diplomatic editor Budimir on the 15th questioned rhetorically whether that epithet was not also intended as an "indirect accusation" against official Yugoslav government statements. Some of the most bitter invective against Kreisky was issued by Zagreb radio's Sundic in commentaries on the 15th and 17th in which he labeled the Chancellor's remarks "crude and insipid" and reminiscent of the propaganda techniques of Goebbels. The Yugoslav media also consistently portrayed Kreisky's reaction as a politically inspired effort to garner Austrian rightwing votes for the national elections in October.

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS TRENDS  
21 MAY 1975

- 25 -

At least one Yugoslav commentary indicated that Belgrade's acute sensitivity to Kreisky's remarks was linked to his 11-14 May visit to neighboring Bulgaria, which has been a similar target of criticism for allegedly attempting to assimilate its Macedonian minority. Zagreb's VJESNIK, according to Belgrade radio on the 16th, implied that Yugoslavia would be less apprehensive about Kreisky's huddling with Sofia's Zhivkov if it were more certain that "this cordial relationship" of its neighbors would not be used to put pressure on Yugoslavia.

CONFIDENTIAL

## C U B A

## HAVANA IGNORES, MOSCOW APPROVES OAS MOVE TO LIFT SANCTIONS

Cuban media have reaffirmed Havana's longstanding disdain for the Organization of American States by ignoring the just-concluded OAS General Assembly session in Washington despite agenda items of direct interest to Cuba's hemispheric relations. Soviet media, on the other hand, continue to report favorably OAS actions toward ending its blockade of Cuba and evidence of Cuba's growing prestige and the failures of U.S. Latin American policy.

**CUBAN SILENCE** Havana, traditionally sensitive to the issues with which the OAS is currently dealing, is not known to have reported the fifth OAS General Assembly in Washington on 8-19 May even though two assembly actions clearly are of great import for Cuba. These were the decision to hold a special July session in Costa Rica that is expected to change voting procedures impeding the removal of sanctions against Cuba, and the assembly's acceptance of a declaration of intent to leave the sanctions "without effect" once the voting procedure has been changed.\* Cuban disregard for the OAS was reiterated in early May, when Havana media coverage of Sen. George McGovern's visit to Cuba made no reference to the OAS except to report Fidel Castro's press conference remark that the OAS had "played a very sad role" and should "dissolve itself."

Havana media only infrequently make an effort to discuss the OAS directly and in any detail. On 30 April, however, only about a week before the latest OAS session and without acknowledging that a meeting was imminent, Havana examined the OAS in a political information program commentary, one of a series presented by the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR) and the interior ministry. Following the FAR program's usual tough line, the 30 April commentary referred to the Rio Treaty as a "pettifogging instrument" aimed at "permitting the use of military force in Latin America

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\* OAS charter rules established through the Rio Pact require a two-thirds majority to impose or lift sanctions. At a foreign minister's meeting in Quito last November, a resolution to revoke the sanctions imposed against Cuba in 1964 was introduced but failed to achieve the necessary two-thirds support, and this failure precipitated the move to amend the Rio Treaty so that a simple majority vote could lift sanctions. The Quito meeting is discussed in the TRENDS of 27 November 1974, pages 20-22.

- 27 -

whenever Washington so desires" and asserted that the OAS had been created to provide "Yankee imperialism" with an apparatus to further its goal of "looting, domination and exploitation." The PAR commentator described past episodes which had "revealed" the OAS' "subjugation" and "immoral" nature and also recalled Castro's prediction that the organization was doomed because, as Latin governments grew more progressive, they would have "more and more contempt" for the OAS. The vitriolic tone of the commentary, broadcast approximately one week before Castro's rather conciliatory press conference of 8 May, demonstrates that although Cuban media reflect the regime's desire for improvement in bilateral relations with OAS members, the organization itself remains a legitimate target for the more outspoken domestic commentators.

MOSCOW  
COMMENT

Moscow preceded Havana in reacting to the OAS General Assembly, as it had done during the Quito meeting, and has approvingly noted the assembly actions related to Cuba. Glossing over OAS actions on other issues, a Yuriy Soltan report on the Moscow domestic radio on 18 May reminded listeners that the Cuba resolution had failed to pass in Quito because "a voting mechanism favorable to the United States was in force." Soltan asserted that since November "rising pressure" from Latin America as well as "demands of the public within the United States itself" were forcing Washington toward a change in its "impractical policy regarding Cuba."

Replaying a well-worn theme, participants in the Moscow weekly international observers roundtable on 18 May noted that the continued blockade of Cuba "contradicts the tendencies toward detente" and "is bereft of any sense." The roundtable participants observed that most OAS members regarded the end of the blockade as "essential," and added that American papers were "confidently" predicting that the sanctions would be lifted this summer. Leonard Kosichev's Spanish-language commentary over Moscow radio on 20 May even had faint words of praise for the organization, which was said to have "finally recognized the inconsistency" of the principles on which inter-American relations were based.

Several Moscow radio broadcasts have discussed the recently completed conference in the context of Cuba's growing prestige and the failure of U.S. policies, both with regard to Cuba and to the U.S.-Latin "new dialogue" supposedly established in 1974. Thus, Moscow domestic service on 10 May reported that "impressive successes" had earned Cuba a "worthy place in the family of Latin American peoples" and claimed that events in Quito had

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- 28 -

strengthened determination "to win a triumph for the will of the Latin American peoples in the OAS." A Radio Moscow observer, in a Spanish-language commentary on 13 May, discussed the assembly in the light of the "new dialogue" established at Tlaltelolco, Mexico, in 1974. Noting that over a year has passed since that meeting the commentator observed that Latins "must be wondering what has been achieved" and implied that U.S. policy had failed because it had not taken cognizance of the current world realities on which Tlaltelolco was based--detente, the rejection of "imperialism, colonialism and neocolonialism," and the desire for "peaceful coexistence among states with different social systems."

Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170023-8



## NOTES

HUNGARIAN PREMIER CHANGE: Jeno Fock, who "retired" as Hungarian premier on 15 May for reasons of health, apparently was the latest victim of Budapest's refurbishing of its orthodox image, an effort made known earlier by the downgrading of other liberals at the March 1974 MSZMP plenum and at the 11th party congress in March 1975. Fock was closely associated with the liberal New Economic Mechanism which the Hungarians had instituted at the start of 1968, and he had aroused Soviet ire three years ago by making unacceptable demands for long-range commitments of Soviet raw materials deliveries to Hungary during his March 1972 visit to Moscow, and by breaking the rules of protocol by revealing the disagreement in an airport interview on his return to Budapest. At this year's congress Fock took responsibility for the somber Hungarian economic situation, including a worsening trade balance. It is a measure of Budapest's independence of Moscow that Fock was removed "while recognizing his services"--a tribute given also to Kadar when he stepped down as premier in 1965 to confine his activity to the party leadership--and that he was given the award of Hero of Socialist Labor "in recognition of his outstanding services over several decades." The appointment of National Planning Office chairman Gyorgy Lazar as new premier exemplifies the Hungarians' new emphasis on centralized planning in their current retrenchment from the New Economic Mechanism. Lazar, as Hungary's permanent representative to CEMA, also has been involved in implementing Moscow's pet project of "socialist economic integration" under CEMA.

PRAVDA ON JAPANESE SOCIALISTS: An authoritative 10 May PRAVDA editorial article has criticized as an "overtly anti-Soviet document" the joint statement issued on 12 May by Peking and the Japan Socialist Party after a JSP delegation concluded its 5-12 May China visit, but implies that Moscow still hopes for friendly relations with the JSP. The statement, which denounced superpower hegemonism and specifically criticized certain Soviet policies, produced the first PRAVDA editorial article devoted to Japan since 1969. Claiming that the statement contradicts official JSP policy, the editorial article--carried by TASS on the 17th--focused its criticism on JSP Chairman Narita, who led the delegation to Peking, observing that some members of the delegation decided not to bother about coordinating their personal attitude with that of the party majority." PRAVDA noted that Narita had been given permission by the party to decide "how to act on the spot" and had taken this mandate and proceeded "all by himself" to "revise the basic course of his party and adopt the

21 MAY 1975

Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170023-8

- 39 -

main postulates of Maoism." PRAVDA suggested that the "extraordinary ease" with which Khatia "abandoned" party positions taken in "officially adopted documents" could have been prompted by the "atmosphere of Peking, where they little reckon with the will of the people." Indicating Moscow's desire to retain good relations with the JSP, the article expressed confidence that the attempt by Peking and "its henchmen" to change JSP policy would "undoubtedly meet with a rebuff on the part of sound forces" who guard Japanese national interests. Moscow has not reported that the JSP central executive committee formally approved the joint statement on 15 May. On the contrary, TASS on 19 May quoted a committee member as calling the statement a "drawback" for the party.

NEW BURMESE CP OVERTHROW: A 16 May Burmese Communist Party Central Committee statement, broadcast by the PRC-based clandestine Voice of the People of Burma (VOPB) on 17 May, has acknowledged for the first time the deaths of former BCP Chairman Thakin Zin and Secretary Thakin Chit and announced the election of Thakin Ba Thein Tin as Chairman. The statement reported that the two leaders were killed on 15 March, during Rangoon's successful military campaign against the BCP in central Burma, noting--also for the first time--that the Burmese government had managed "the recapture of some areas in the Pegu Yoma mountains." It nonetheless expressed optimism over the BCP's future in contrast to the "Ye Win-San Yu military clique," which was depicted as beset with insoluble "contradictions" and presently facing acute political, economic, and military crises. In a long speech carried over VOPB on 17 May, Thakin Ba Thein Tin praised the role of BCP base areas and said that the BCP's foundation on "collective leadership" under the Central Committee and the party's correct line of protracted armed struggle insured the BCP's eventual success. Since the 15 March setback the VOPB had alluded only to the inevitability of "serious losses" in armed struggle, without actually acknowledging the deaths of Thakin Zin and Thakin Chit. Thakin Ba Thein Tin--who has long resided in Peking--last appeared publicly at this year's May Day celebrations in Peking, where he was identified by NCA as BCP Central Committee Vice Chairman. A brief 20 May Chinese CP Central Committee message extended sympathy to the BCP over the leadership deaths, expressed confidence that the BCP would "unite closely" around the Central Committee "headed by Chairman Thakin Ba Thein Tin," and praised the BCP's "correct line" without specifically referring to the Rangoon government. On 20 May, however, NCA took the unusual step of replaying the text of the 16 May BCP statement, including its references to the "Ye Win-San Yu military clique." Peking in recent years has not replayed BCP statements without deleting mention of the Rangoon government by name.

CONFIDENTIAL

Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200170023-8

- 1 -

# APPENDIX

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 12 - 18 MAY 1975

| <u>Moscow (2614 items)</u>                         |       |     | <u>Peking (362 items)</u>             |      |     |
|--|-------|-----|---------------------------------------|------|-----|
| V-E Day 30th Anniversary                           | (52%) | 14% | Teng Hsiao-ping in France             | (--) | 16% |
| (Party/Government Appeal)                          | (4%)  | 3%  | "Liberation" of South Vietnam         | (7%) | 9%  |
| Kosygin in Mideast                                 | (--)  | 12% | Cambodia                              | (6%) | 9%  |
| (Tunisia Visit)                                    | (--)  | 2%  | (Mayaguez Incident)                   | (--) | 5%  |
| (Libya Visit)                                      | (--)  | 7%  | Japanese Socialist Delegations in PRC | (3%) | 7%  |
| Union Republic Supreme Soviet Election Nominations | (--)  | 7%  | (Joint Statement)                     | (--) | 3%  |
| China  | (3%)  | 7%  |                                       |      |     |
| Warsaw Pact 20th Anniversary                       | (--)  | 6%  |                                       |      |     |
| Vietnam  | (3%)  | 5%  |                                       |      |     |

These statistics are based on the content and commentary compiled by the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive coverage are counted as commentaries.

Percentages in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week. Topics and events given major allocation in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior trends, in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.